Introduction
Sport is a universal phenomenon with great social and economic relevance. The budget for the 2012 Olympics in London exceeds £2 billion. An increasing number of athletes play sports professionally. Millions of people watch their performances live at the stadium or on television. A fitting regulatory framework is required to steer sports practice in the right direction. Traditionally, this has been the prerogative of the sporting associations. Gradually, also local and national governments become involved in this. At European level, however, subjected to scrutiny. 5 The repercussions of an eventual failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty for Europe's sports policy will also be considered.
Sport in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
During the sessions of the European Convention, several options with regard to the future role of the EU in the field of sport passed the review. 6 Firstly, one considered whether sport could be granted an exemption from the application of the Community rules, a solution which many sporting federations favoured. 7 This would enable them to settle their affairs internally. And the European institutions would no longer be saddled with difficult, long and costly disputes relating to sport. However, it is highly uncertain whether such a solution would turn out to be an improvement for all clubs, athletes and federations concerned. Moreover, for such an exemption to be formalised in a Treaty amendment or a Protocol attached to the Treaty, the approval of all Member States is required to revise the Treaty in this respect. 8 It seemed improbable that such a consensus could ever be found. 9 Besides, the sporting world has failed to come up with convincing arguments which would justify taking such a drastic measure. 10 For these reasons, this option was firmly discarded. Secondly, one also contemplated a status quo, implying that the Community institutions are simply to proceed with their activities in the domain of sport, without any formal changes being made to the Treaty. Arguably, this option would not cause the Community's indirect approach to sport to undergo any radical changes, as the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement rules and competition law would continue constituting the regulatory framework against which the lawfulness of sporting rules and practices is scrutinised. It would 5 On the distinction between indirect and direct sports approach, Tokarski, Steinbach, Petry 
The Union and the Member States shall foster co-operation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the
Council of Europe. 'obvious and convincing'. 52 That may very well be, but it must be acknowledged that in contemporary society, the Court's explanation for this 'restriction on the scope of Community law' does no longer reflect reality. In general, matches between national teams are no longer of 'purely sporting interest'. The Court's position appears thus to be too generous towards the sporting world. It is submitted that an elegant solution to rectify this would be to adhere in this respect to the position adopted already in Deliège. 53 In that case the contested selection rules inevitably had the effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament, but such a limitation was regarded as being 'inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports event, which necessarily involves certain selection rules or criteria being adopted.' 54 Such rules could not in themselves be regarded as constituting a restriction on the principle of freedom of movement. The Court also held that the adoption of one system for selecting participants rather than another must be based 'on a large number of considerations unconnected with the personal situation of any athlete, such as the nature, the organization and the financing of the sport concerned.' 55 By analogy, it could be stipulated that a rule requiring athletes to have the nationality of the country of which they represent the national team in international sporting events does not in itself, as long as it derives from a need inherent in the organisation of such a competition, constitute a restriction on the Treaty free movement provisions. 56 This solution appears to be entirely satisfactory: on the one hand, it reflects the assumption that in encounters between national teams, matters such as national pride and identity still play a decisive role and, in principle, outweigh the economic and financial interests at stake. As a result, these matches, in principle, deserve shelter from the application of Community law. On the other hand, it does not turn a blind eye to the reality that matches between national teams often have become huge commercial events. Therefore, when the restrictive effect of these particular nationality clauses goes beyond what is necessary and inherent to organise matches between national teams, Articles 39 and 49 EC will come into play. This conclusion fits squarely into the Court's principled statement that the 'restriction on the scope of the provisions in question must remain limited to its 52 Lenz AG in Bosman, above n. 25, para. 139. 53 For more information about the case, see also proper objective and cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity' from the scope of the Treaty.
In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this
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The legal situation of naturalised athletes and sportsmen with a dual nationality could serve as a test-case for the proposed solution. Nowadays, several athletes are prepared to do just about everything to be able to compete in international competitions. Nationality changes are becoming increasingly frequent. 58 Federations do not adopt a uniform position in this respect.
Some allow an athlete to compete for a country when he has acquired the nationality of this country, regardless of whether he has already competed for another country, 59 whereas others prohibit a sportsman to wear the shirt of two different countries during his career. 60 There are also federations which make the permission to compete for another country conditional upon fulfilment of a number of conditions, such as a waiting period. 61 players more favourable than foreign players with the nationality of a country belonging to the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA). 63 The Court categorically held that the arguments relating to the maintenance of a traditional link between a club and its country, the creation of a sufficient pool of players for the national team and the preservation of a competitive balance between clubs were not such as to preserve the nationality clauses under the objective justification doctrine. 64 In the light of the discriminatory nature of these nationality clauses, this strict approach is rather unobjectionable.
However, the Court's ruling in Bosman did not signal the end of nationality clauses at club level. Many associations held on to quota with regard to third-country nationals. In 2003, the Court was invited to express its opinion on the legality of such nationality requirements. The case of Kolpak involved a professional handball goalkeeper of Slovak nationality who played in the German second division and who challenged the rule of the German handball federation, stipulating that clubs were entitled to field only two non-EU/EEA nationals in official matches.
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The Court concluded that Kolpak, who was legally employed in Germany, could legitimately invoke Article 38(1) of the Association Agreement concluded between the European Communities and Slovakia, which confers the right to equal treatment to Slovak nationals as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal in the EU in relation to the host Member State's nationals. 66 Again, the Court showed no inclination to accept the arguments to justify the contested rule, which were grossly the same as in Bosman. 67 The potential impact of this decision is far-reaching: the European Communities have concluded international agreements containing a similar equal treatment clause with a large number of third-countries, and arguably, a lot of them seem to fulfil the criteria for direct effect. 68 Admittedly, the dispute in Kolpak concerned a national from a country which was, at the time of the proceedings, at the verge of becoming an EU Member State. The impression could therefore not entirely be discarded that the final 63 Bosman, above n. 25, paras 115-120. 64 Bosman, above n. 25, paras 121-137. In view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the Community, the Court did accept the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players as legitimate in principle (para. 106). Subsequently, however, it went on to rule that the contested nationality clauses did not comply with the principle of proportionality. 65 the message that the hard line it had previously adopted with regard to nationality discrimination of EU/EEA nationals is to be extended to privileged third-country nationals. For these non-EU/EEA sportsmen to be able to challenge nationality clauses, it suffices that they are legally employed in a host EU Member State and can rely upon a directly effective equal treatment provision included in an international agreement establishing a partnership between the European
Communities and their country of origin, regardless of whether accession to the EU is envisaged or not. 70 Strictly legally speaking, the lifeline of nationality clauses at club level in sport appears now thinner than ever.
In this particular context, one final observation is on its place: the last decade, enlargement and integration-prone developments have been the magic formula of the EU, the driving forces behind many a European policy. Now that the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty turns out to be much more troublesome than expected, it cannot be excluded that this somehow might exert an influence on Europe's indirect sports approach in the near future. It is hard to predict with absolute certainty how the Court of Justice will react to the current crisis in the EU. Is it fair or even reasonable to state that the outcome of a case such as Conceptually, the Court of Justice has consistently adopted the same rigorous approach in all cases concerning the mobility of sportsmen within the EU, involving nationality clauses, transfer payments, selection procedures, transfer periods or the likes of it. The Court's search for a solution within the Community framework, which takes into account the claims of the sporting authorities and at the same time complies with the exigencies of Community law, is effectuated on a case-by-case basis, and is thus influenced by the circumstances of each case. The Court's record for its dealings with sports related cases is unquestionably rather good. 72 In sporting circles, the Court is often criticised for over-accentuating the importance of the migration rights of the individual athletes in this respect. It is alleged that on this ground, the Court has effectuated or allowed too many and too intrusive judicial inroads on the self-proclaimed spheres of autonomous competence of the sporting bodies, thereby infringing their freedom of association and failing to take sufficient account of the specific needs of sport. Arguably, this submission is unfounded. The Court has never interfered with sporting rules sensu strictu, the 'rules of the game', such as, the length of matches or the height of the net. On the contrary, it is advocated that the Community institutions have at times probably shown too much respect for the autonomy of the sporting authorities and have overrated the special status of sport, both from a factual and 71 See X, 'Homegrown plan wins approval', 21 April 2005 (consult http://www.uefa.com). This plan would apply to future UEFA club competitions, but UEFA has also asked its associations to consider applying the same rules to national competitions. 72 Concurring, Weatherill, above n. 29, 51.
from a legal point of view. Sport does indeed possess certain special features, such as the mutual interdependence of sports teams, and at times, the special treatment accorded to sport under Community law appears therefore to be legitimate, whether it is to maintain a certain sporting and financial balance between sport clubs, to ensure the homogeneity and the regularity of competitions or to preserve the essential element of unpredictability of outcome. However, this
should not go to the detriment of the rights of the sportsmen, or at least have only a minimal and proportionate impact. 73 Presumably, at the moment the perfect balance between all interests at stake has not been found yet. It can, in particular, rightly be questioned whether the training and development of young players really constitutes a legitimate aim which is sufficiently specific to the sports sector so as to justify restrictions to the freedom of movement of athletes? 74 This seems by no means evident.
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Sport & competition law
Under the heading of the competition rules, the Community institutions, in the first place output. However, after UEFA had undertaken to change its regulations, it held that an appropriate joint selling arrangement could benefit from an exemption under Article 81(3) EC, putting reliance also on the financial solidarity between clubs. The new arrangement contains a segmentation of the media rights in 14 different rights packages, which are to be sold separately on the basis of a public bidding procedure, and which concern not only TV rights, but also all other media rights, such as radio or internet. that it is intended to preserve the spirit of fair play and to safeguard the health of athletes. In the opinion of the Court of First Instance, without fair play, 'sport, be it amateur or professional, is no longer sport. That purely social objective is sufficient to justify the campaign against doping.'
The prohibition of doping must be regarded as a 'particular expression of the requirement of fair play', and constitutes a 'cardinal rule of sport'. 85 Moreover, the Court of First Instance stipulated that 'sport is essentially a gratuitous and not an economic act, even when the athlete performs it in the course of professional sport.
[…] The prohibition of doping and the anti-doping legislation concern exclusively, even when the sporting action is performed by a professional, a non- 93 Again, the Court's reasoning leading up to the final decision does not appear to be entirely satisfactory. 94 Arguably, the significance of the ruling lies role and powers of the sporting associations. It signalled that FIFA adopted the contested regulations of its own authority and not 'on the basis of rule-making powers conferred on it by public authorities in connection with a recognised task in the general interest concerning sporting activity.' 95 Moreover, it held that those regulations do not fall within the scope of the freedom of internal organisation enjoyed by sports associations either. Therefore the Court of First Instance ruled that the legitimacy of a private organisation like FIFA to enact rules 'which do not have a sport-related object, but regulate an economic activity that is peripheral to the sporting activity in question and touch on fundamental freedoms' is questionable and that such rules cannot be automatically regarded as compatible with Community law, in particular with regard to respect for civil and economic liberties. 96 Concretely, the Court stipulated that the Players' Agents
Regulations are a reflection of FIFA's resolve to coordinate the conduct of its members with regard to the activity of players' agents and constitute a decision by an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. 97 It also decided that FIFA holds a collective dominant position on the market for players' agents' services. 102 For instance, it does not seem inconceivable that a rule imposing a sports sanction on a club which is considered to have induced a player to unilaterally breach his contract with another club, consisting of a prohibition to acquire new players during a certain period, might be qualified as unjustifiably restricting competition between clubs. If the period is too long, especially the principle of proportionality might not be respected. See Van den Bogaert, above n. 50, pp. 213-320.
In general, the relation between the European institutions and the sporting world can best be qualified as uncomfortable. The introduction of sport in the European Constitution might add an interesting new dimension to the 'sport and European law' saga. At first sight, there is not much spectacular about Articles I-17 and III-282. In the near future no major changes would have to be expected in the EU approach to sport. The application of the free movement provisions and the competition law rules to sports rules and practices would in all likelihood simply proceed, paying due regard to the specific characteristics of sport. The importance of this Treaty reference to sport would be largely symbolical, legitimising Community action already taken in the field of sport. Be that as it may, attention should be paid not to overlook its intrinsic strengths: the official recognition of sports as a Union policy could be instructive to the European institutions to find a more appropriate balance between the wishes of the sporting world and the exigencies of European law. Moreover, it would neatly delineate the room for manoeuvring of the European institutions in the field of sport, establishing that they can only carry out supporting, coordinating or complementary action, thereby thus implicitly respecting and confirming the primary role of the sporting associations. All in all, therefore, the inclusion of sport in the Treaty must be welcomed, although the exclusion of any harmonising measures can be deplored.
In the event that it were to turn out impossible or unworkable to implement the European Constitution and this were to mean the demise of sport in the Treaty, the consequences for the European sports policy would not be too far-reaching. It would be especially hard to intensify and streamline the European direct sports policy, but this was bound to remain limited in scope after all. Nevertheless, the Treaty provisions concerning sport do seem to create the opportunity for the European institutions and the sporting federations to be no longer uneasy bedfellows. It would be a pity not to seize the occasion.
